REFLECTIONS ON ZO KINDRED SOLIDARITIES AND THE POLITICAL PROGRESS OF OUR MOVEMENT
One year and three months have passed since the outbreak of the Manipur conflict. This particular event has been so traumatic that it has caused a trigger of political re-awakening and re-ignited interest emerging out of a common sense of anger, humiliation and frustration. The sudden trauma of the May massacre and the ensuing geographic separation of our people with the valley Meiteis was testified in the joint Press Release made by the 10 Kuki-Zomi-Hmar MLAs in June 2023.
This emergency also triggered multiple attempts to solidify a joint platform for coordination among the tribes in the form of a Coordinating Committee on Separate Administration Movement (CORSAM) that took under its umbrella; the various CSOs like ITLF & COTU, the various Innpis like Zomi Council, Kuki Innpi and Hmar Inpui, the SoO groups under UPF & KNO, and the 10 MLAs. Though brought together by a common emergency, the coordinating body however was unable to keep such a seemingly large pool of groups with diverse interests together for too long and soon dissolved into mayhem.
Understanding the ‘elephant in the room’
Though not apparent at the time, the breakdown of the CORSAM seemed to mark the early onset of division among the Zo people that, one year later, has made itself explicit in public attitude and social media. This division among the northern Zo people is not new but a recurrent issue that has often been at the odd end of several debates and even conflicts. Even this usage of ‘northern Zo people’ in order to refer to those of us in Manipur, rather than as ‘Kuki’ or ‘Zomi’ would be a cause for political and intellectual disagreements.
Herein lies the supposed ‘elephant in the room’ that will hopefully be brought to light, at least partly, if not fully, to bring about a modicum of mutual understanding. While some stick with the opinion that what many call, a nomenclature war, is a product of external political elements like the Naga insurgency and Manipur state and electoral politics, others are of the conviction that it is a post-colonial replacement of etic/colonial categories with emic self-identification as having more spiritual and social depth in a post-colonial era.
It would be important to note that both fragments of thought are relevant at different levels. Although these arguments are primarily intellectual in nature and the debate between ‘Kuki’ and the ‘Zomi’ has been mostly made within the ‘etic-emic’ dichotomy, intellectuals and scholars on both sides have almost never conceded to the fact that overtime, these intellectual debates trickle down and solidify within sections of our community, along clannish, locational/geographic and linguistic/dialect lines.
The nature of this trickling down of identity solidification is further shaped by historical experiences among particular dialect groups (or ‘tribes’) and clans. Two comparative (rather simplified) historical instances have been given below to expand on how this has shaped the present socio-political dimensions that we see our current movement in Manipur –
The Mizo Union, formed in the 1940s, which was the first revolutionary political collective among the Zo people, had as its main goal, the removal of chieftainship in order to lead the people into a new age out of feudal chieftainship into a constitutional democratic form of collective governance. Their other main aim was for the administrative integration of all Zo-inhabited areas. The early leadership of the Mizo Union was drawn largely (not solely) from the Hmar tribe, (like HK Bawichhuaka for example), but the Union failed in its aim to integrate other Zo (outside the then Lushai hills district) areas, especially Hmar areas into it. This led to a deep sense of alienation among the Hmar, and overtime led to their assertion of being Hmar as an entity that is connected but distinct within the Mizo umbrella, especially in Manipur and Assam.
The Kuki National Assembly in Manipur had a similar time of birth as the Mizo Union. However, it was a mainly chief-led coalition which at the time (still is) dominated by the Thadou-speaking clans. The attempt to collectively organize all the Zo people in Manipur under this Assembly was thwarted during the meeting in the Kuki Cooperative Society in Imphal in 1946 with the imposition of Thadou-dialect as the official language, which at the time was staunchly opposed by then leaders like TC Tiankham and Teba Kilong. This led to the birth of the Khul Union in the same year.
As such, the manner of solidarity formation among the Zo people in Manipur (unlike Mizoram) since Indian independence followed a dual path consisting of overlapping clan memberships on one hand, but with dialect-based (aka, tribe) dominated memberships on the other.
In the case of the Mizo Union, their success in removing chieftainship and rallying around the emic term ‘Mizo’ as opposed to Lushai, which represented the tribe of the then chiefs, brought about a new sense of egalitarianism which transcended tribe boundaries to a large extent. On the other hand, the situation in Manipur was a lot more complex. The Kuki National Assembly was an almost all-chiefs organization that sought to solidify its hold within the new parliamentary set-up. The Khul Union on the other hand though opposed chieftainship and campaigned vigorously against it, did not survive long enough due to tribal divisions that got caught up in the insurgent Naga wave. While some joined the Naga bus, the rest overtime, sought to be brought together under the banner of ‘Zomi’ as an emic identity following the Mizo example. This was during the peak of the second phase of the Mizo movement (This time, led by the MNF), in the 1980s, under the leadership of Pu T Gougin and Pu Thankhangin. All these developments took place in the backdrop of a hugely unstable state of Manipur that created a situation of unease and anxiety among the tribes.
As noted before, particular historical experiences have interpolated with on one hand, the etic-emic debate, and on the other, the power balance between clan and dialect-groups, are not confined to the intellectual sphere, but very easily trickle down to the political realm. This has been the cause of previous conflicts like the Kuki-Hmar conflict of the 1960s and Kuki-Zomi conflict in 1997-98. As such, despite the persistent cross-cutting of clan linkages across tribes, there has become a solidification of political identities in the form of “nomenclatures/nations”, which are historically specific and held on tightly by their constituent members.
As such, on one hand, ‘Kuki’ is a colonial/etic category that has been used to refer to all the Zo people by the Britishers (and Meiteis), and on the other, ‘Zomi’ (like Mizo) is a post-colonial/indigenous/emic category that refers to all the Zo people. However, the real-world application and membership of the terms in the context of Manipur reduces both to particular ‘dialect-based’ and particular clan-dominated group memberships. Members and adherents to both are strongly attached to their respective namings, in the zeal of nationalistic spirit, but also interpolated with tribal prejudices. An example of this solidification, outside the Kuki and Zomi instances, can be seen in the Mizo case, which claims membership and adherence of all the Zo people within the state of Mizoram, but outside the state, becomes limited mostly to Lushai-speaking tribes, with a few exceptions.
William Shaw in his Notes on the Thadou-Kuki, has recorded protests among certain tribes against the identification with Kuki during his tenure as the District Collector in Tamenglong during colonial times. However, this situation is one that has mostly developed out of the more than 75 years of political development since Indian independence, and thus zealously guarded and adhered to, much as the warriors of bygone eras stick their loyalty to the chief, and that chief to his warrior. This is also why selective commissions and omissions of either Kuki or Zomi or Hmar, at least among/within the Zo brethren tribes, often become a point of controversy and disagreement.
On the other hand, parliamentary debates have long acknowledged the political dynamics of the Zo people. An example can be seen in the Rajya Sabha discussion of August 9, 1988 where the Minister of Home Affairs noted the formation of the Zomi Reunification Organization (referring to ZoRO, the ‘mi’ in ZoRO was later removed) and its aim to contribute towards the Greater Mizoram movement.
Common Political Predicaments
Despite lurking disagreements and painful memories of conflict, the common anxiety of the northern Zo people has been the insecurity of living in Manipur state; the absence of constitutional safeguards like the Sixth Schedule that is present in other tribal areas in Northeast India. This is where the role of the Suspension of Operation (SoO) groups and political dialogues continue to play an important role in ensuring the collective future of our people.
The first Suspension of Operation (SoO) agreement with a promise to open political dialogue was signed between the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) and the Central Government in 2005. This was followed by the formation of the United People’s Front (UPF) with the Hmar People Convention (HPC-D) and Kuki National Front (KNF-P) and other groups, which then entered the SoO pact in 2006. The Kuki National Organization (KNO) and its constituent member organizations joined the SoO following this development in 2008. This started the period of silence as all the major political/insurgent outfits among the northern Zo people ceased fire.
The progress of this tripartite political dialogue remained slow but received a political push when the 3 Bills controversy sparked riots and caused the deaths of nine innocent civilians in Lamka. Pu Ronald Sapa Tlau, then honorable MP Mizoram, raised our collective issue in the Rajya Sabha on December 9, 2015, stating the need to “expedite the tripartite talks involving the Zomi, Kuki and Hmar armed groups of United Peoples Front (UPF) and Kuki National Organization (KNO) for permanent solution.”
This eventually resulted in the appointment of a government interlocutor, which enabled us to start political dialogue with both the central and state governments in 2019. The need to expedite the political dialogue was also raised by veteran parliamentarians like Pu Biswajit Daimari, honorable MP from Assam, under the heading “Kuki-Zomi-Hmar and Bodo problems” on December 11, 2019.
As the conflict burst out and our people were entirely driven out of the valley in Manipur, the SoO dynamics also changed with a shift in our demands. Given the volatility and danger of our situation, it was no longer possible for our people to travel to Imphal. This required the need for a total Separate Administration (SA) outside the administrative ambit of Manipur. In Delhi, four rounds of talks took place on July 16, August 17, August 31 and September 1 between KNO-UPF and the Home Ministry. A collective Charter of Demands (COD) was made that demanded the implementation of Article 239A which allowed for the creation of a Union Territory with Legislature, following the Puducherry model.
While the usage of “Kuki-Zo” has been popularized by the ITLF and adopted by the Kuki Innpi, its social definition remains vague in an intellectual sense. On the other hand, its real-world application has become increasingly focused around a Kuki Innpi centred administrative ambit, which automatically excludes other conglomerate councils. All the political progress made so far, with regard to real and tangible developments, has been made following a policy of mutual respect, accommodation and representation, arising out of specific historical instances as mentioned in the first half of the article. A breaking away from this precedent puts forth the danger of exacerbating internal divisions in the façade of a uniform unity.
Take-aways -
Our common political predicament is always intersected by the ‘elephant in the room’ phenomenon. Over the years, and more so, after the current outburst of conflict, the theme of ‘Unity’ has rung in all sections of our society, and yet the manner of this ‘Unity’ again becomes a theme of debate and disagreement. While the usage of ‘Kuki-Zo’ in itself is not a negative development, its intersection with maneuvers of political exclusion internally, has made it representative, at most, in the level of news and media coverages that are limited by short-hand requirements. On the other hand, all real and tangible political development (preceding and since the current conflict), have been made, representatively in the form of ‘Kuki-Zomi-Hmar’ groups, as has developed and solidified over the many years of SoO and eventual political dialogues.
As the current conflict and the movement for Separate Administration shifts from the emergency of armed attacks as of May-June 2023 to the more political and parliamentary maneuverings that may probably continue for some time, internal political maneuvers among the northern Zo people are also bound to happen. The question for unity would thus be, whether the ‘elephant in the room’ is hidden beneath a façade of uniform unity, or, is properly acknowledged, allowing for open internal dialogue and stronger solidarity built on mutual recognition of distinct but connected experiences and the effort to drive a shared political future.
The view expressed in the article are those of the author, he can be contacted for any queries at valtetawna@gmail.com
Photo credit: Ginza Vualzong
Photo credit: Deepak